These tools will no longer be maintained as of December 31, 2024. Archived website can be found here. PubMed4Hh GitHub repository can be found here. Contact NLM Customer Service if you have questions.


BIOMARKERS

Molecular Biopsy of Human Tumors

- a resource for Precision Medicine *

214 related articles for article (PubMed ID: 21659631)

  • 1. Risk of collective failure provides an escape from the tragedy of the commons.
    Santos FC; Pacheco JM
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A; 2011 Jun; 108(26):10421-5. PubMed ID: 21659631
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 2. Climate change governance, cooperation and self-organization.
    Pacheco JM; Vasconcelos VV; Santos FC
    Phys Life Rev; 2014 Dec; 11(4):573-86. PubMed ID: 24613645
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 3. An oscillating tragedy of the commons in replicator dynamics with game-environment feedback.
    Weitz JS; Eksin C; Paarporn K; Brown SP; Ratcliff WC
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A; 2016 Nov; 113(47):E7518-E7525. PubMed ID: 27830651
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 4. Escaping the tragedy of the commons via directed investments.
    Vukov J; Santos FC; Pacheco JM
    J Theor Biol; 2011 Oct; 287():37-41. PubMed ID: 21819996
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 5. Individual solutions to shared problems create a modern tragedy of the commons.
    Gross J; De Dreu CKW
    Sci Adv; 2019 Apr; 5(4):eaau7296. PubMed ID: 31001579
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 6. Cooperation, Trust, and Antagonism: How Public Goods Are Promoted.
    Parks CD; Joireman J; Van Lange PA
    Psychol Sci Public Interest; 2013 Dec; 14(3):119-65. PubMed ID: 26171620
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 7. Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games.
    Santos FC; Santos MD; Pacheco JM
    Nature; 2008 Jul; 454(7201):213-6. PubMed ID: 18615084
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 8. Replicator-mutator dynamics with evolutionary public goods game-environmental feedbacks.
    Du C; Lu Y; Zhang Y; Shen C; Shi L; Guo H
    Chaos; 2024 Apr; 34(4):. PubMed ID: 38572947
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 9. Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game.
    Liu L; Chen X; Szolnoki A
    Elife; 2023 May; 12():. PubMed ID: 37204305
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 10. Asymmetric public goods game cooperation through pest control.
    Reeves T; Ohtsuki H; Fukui S
    J Theor Biol; 2017 Dec; 435():238-247. PubMed ID: 28939346
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 11. Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment.
    Couto MC; Pacheco JM; Santos FC
    J Theor Biol; 2020 Nov; 505():110423. PubMed ID: 32726648
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 12. Intergroup Cooperation in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas.
    Sadowski J; Spierre SG; Selinger E; Seager TP; Adams EA; Berardy A
    Sci Eng Ethics; 2015 Oct; 21(5):1197-215. PubMed ID: 25082500
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 13. Spatial evolutionary public goods game on complete graph and dense complex networks.
    Kim J; Chae H; Yook SH; Kim Y
    Sci Rep; 2015 Mar; 5():9381. PubMed ID: 25796988
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 14. Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game.
    Semmann D; Krambeck HJ; Milinski M
    Nature; 2003 Sep; 425(6956):390-3. PubMed ID: 14508487
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 15. Reward and punishment in climate change dilemmas.
    Góis AR; Santos FP; Pacheco JM; Santos FC
    Sci Rep; 2019 Nov; 9(1):16193. PubMed ID: 31700020
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 16. Cooperation dynamics in collective risk games with endogenous endowments.
    Quan J; Zhang X; Chen W; Wang X
    Chaos; 2023 Jul; 33(7):. PubMed ID: 37408149
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 17. Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
    Murase Y; Baek SK
    J Theor Biol; 2018 Jul; 449():94-102. PubMed ID: 29678691
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 18. Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation.
    He JZ; Wang RW; Jensen CX; Li YT
    Sci Rep; 2015 Jan; 5():7715. PubMed ID: 25586876
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 19. Deterrence through punishment can resolve collective risk dilemmas in carbon emission games.
    Jiang LL; Chen Z; Perc M; Wang Z; Kurths J; Moreno Y
    Chaos; 2023 Apr; 33(4):. PubMed ID: 37097939
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

  • 20. Hypochaos prevents tragedy of the commons in discrete-time eco-evolutionary game dynamics.
    Sohel Mondal S; Ray A; Chakraborty S
    Chaos; 2024 Feb; 34(2):. PubMed ID: 38377296
    [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]  

    [Next]    [New Search]
    of 11.