These tools will no longer be maintained as of December 31, 2024. Archived website can be found here. PubMed4Hh GitHub repository can be found here. Contact NLM Customer Service if you have questions.
2. Signalling among relatives. II. Beyond the tower of Babel. Lachmann M; Bergstrom CT Theor Popul Biol; 1998 Oct; 54(2):146-60. PubMed ID: 9733656 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
3. An evolutionary advantage for extravagant honesty. Bullock S J Theor Biol; 2012 Jan; 292():30-8. PubMed ID: 21964260 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
4. Error-proneness as a handicap signal. De Jaegher K J Theor Biol; 2003 Sep; 224(2):139-52. PubMed ID: 12927522 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
5. Are aposematic signals honest? A review. Summers K; Speed MP; Blount JD; Stuckert AM J Evol Biol; 2015 Sep; 28(9):1583-99. PubMed ID: 26079980 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
6. Threat displays are not handicaps. Számadó S J Theor Biol; 2003 Apr; 221(3):327-48. PubMed ID: 12642112 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
7. The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty. Biernaskie JM; Grafen A; Perry JC Proc Biol Sci; 2014 Sep; 281(1790):. PubMed ID: 25056623 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
8. Honesty in signalling games is maintained by trade-offs rather than costs. Számadó S; Zachar I; Czégel D; Penn DJ BMC Biol; 2023 Jan; 21(1):4. PubMed ID: 36617556 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
9. Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games. Bergstrom CT; Számadó S; Lachmann M Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci; 2002 Nov; 357(1427):1595-606. PubMed ID: 12495516 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
10. The evolution of exploitation and honesty in animal communication: a model using artificial neural networks. Krakauer DC; Johnstone RA Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci; 1995 May; 348(1325):355-61. PubMed ID: 8577830 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
11. Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication. Zollman KJ; Bergstrom CT; Huttegger SM Proc Biol Sci; 2013 Jan; 280(1750):20121878. PubMed ID: 23135681 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
12. When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game. Számadó S BMC Evol Biol; 2017 Dec; 17(1):270. PubMed ID: 29281957 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
13. Can behavioural constraints alter the stability of signalling equilibria? Proulx SR Proc Biol Sci; 2001 Nov; 268(1483):2307-13. PubMed ID: 11703870 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
14. Do aggressive signals evolve towards higher reliability or lower costs of assessment? Ręk P J Evol Biol; 2014 Dec; 27(12):2605-13. PubMed ID: 25290527 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
15. Cost, competition and information in communication between relatives. Brilot BO; Johnstone RA J Theor Biol; 2002 Aug; 217(3):331-40. PubMed ID: 12270277 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
16. Why we need ESS signalling theory. Grafen A; Johnstone RA Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci; 1993 May; 340(1292):245-50. PubMed ID: 8101658 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
17. The evolution of individual variation in communication strategies. Botero CA; Pen I; Komdeur J; Weissing FJ Evolution; 2010 Nov; 64(11):3123-33. PubMed ID: 20561050 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
19. One problem, too many solutions: How costly is honest signalling of need? Számadó S; Czégel D; Zachar I PLoS One; 2019; 14(1):e0208443. PubMed ID: 30633748 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
20. Some mistakes go unpunished: the evolution of "all or nothing" signalling. Broom M; Ruxton GD Evolution; 2011 Oct; 65(10):2743-9. PubMed ID: 21967417 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related] [Next] [New Search]