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23. Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment. Ohtsuki H; Iwasa Y; Nowak MA Nature; 2009 Jan; 457(7225):79-82. PubMed ID: 19122640 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
24. Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties. Bone J; Silva AS; Raihani NJ Biol Lett; 2014 Jul; 10(7):. PubMed ID: 25079496 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
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27. Cooperation without punishment. Battu B; Rahwan T Sci Rep; 2023 Jan; 13(1):1213. PubMed ID: 36681708 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
28. Lab support for strong reciprocity is weak: punishing for reputation rather than cooperation. Shaw A; Santos L Behav Brain Sci; 2012 Feb; 35(1):39. PubMed ID: 22289329 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
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30. When punishment pays. Roberts G PLoS One; 2013; 8(3):e57378. PubMed ID: 23483907 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
31. Culture: the missing piece in theories of weak and strong reciprocity. Read D Behav Brain Sci; 2012 Feb; 35(1):35-6. PubMed ID: 22289325 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
33. Perspectives from ethnography on weak and strong reciprocity. Wiessner P Behav Brain Sci; 2012 Feb; 35(1):44-5. PubMed ID: 22289335 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
34. When the strong punish: why net costs of punishment are often negligible. von Rueden CR; Gurven M Behav Brain Sci; 2012 Feb; 35(1):43-4. PubMed ID: 22289334 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
35. Is strong reciprocity really strong in the lab, let alone in the real world? Güney Ş; Newell BR Behav Brain Sci; 2012 Feb; 35(1):29. PubMed ID: 22289318 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
36. Human behaviour: Egalitarian motive and altruistic punishment. Fowler JH; Johnson T; Smirnov O Nature; 2005 Jan; 433(7021):1 p following 32; discussion following 32. PubMed ID: 15637787 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
37. Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans. Diekmann A; Przepiorka W Sci Rep; 2015 May; 5():10321. PubMed ID: 25988875 [TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
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