261 related articles for article (PubMed ID: 3808044)
1. TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation.
Milinski M
Nature; 1987 Jan 29-Feb 4; 325(6103):433-5. PubMed ID: 3808044
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
2. The spatial struggle of tit-for-tat and defect.
Hutson VC; Vickers GT
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci; 1995 Jun; 348(1326):393-404. PubMed ID: 7480111
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
3. Variation in behaviour promotes cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
McNamara JM; Barta Z; Houston AI
Nature; 2004 Apr; 428(6984):745-8. PubMed ID: 15085131
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
4. A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Nowak M; Sigmund K
Nature; 1993 Jul; 364(6432):56-8. PubMed ID: 8316296
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
5. No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma.
Lorberbaum J
J Theor Biol; 1994 May; 168(2):117-30. PubMed ID: 8022193
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
6. Mutual Restraint in Tree Swallows: A Test of the TIT FOR TAT Model of Reciprocity.
Lombardo MP
Science; 1985 Mar; 227(4692):1363-5. PubMed ID: 17793772
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
7. Evolution of strategies in the three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma game.
Matsushima M; Ikegami T
J Theor Biol; 1998 Nov; 195(1):53-67. PubMed ID: 9802950
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
8. Resolving the iterated prisoner's dilemma: theory and reality.
Raihani NJ; Bshary R
J Evol Biol; 2011 Aug; 24(8):1628-39. PubMed ID: 21599777
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
9. The evolution of n-player cooperation-threshold games and ESS bifurcations.
Bach LA; Helvik T; Christiansen FB
J Theor Biol; 2006 Jan; 238(2):426-34. PubMed ID: 16045941
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
10. Optimality under noise: higher memory strategies for the alternating prisoner's dilemma.
Neill DB
J Theor Biol; 2001 Jul; 211(2):159-80. PubMed ID: 11419957
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
11. Are there really no evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma?
Lorberbaum JP; Bohning DE; Shastri A; Sine LE
J Theor Biol; 2002 Jan; 214(2):155-69. PubMed ID: 11812170
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
12. Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat.
Yi SD; Baek SK; Choi JK
J Theor Biol; 2017 Jan; 412():1-7. PubMed ID: 27670803
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
13. The evolution of degrees of cooperation.
Frean M
J Theor Biol; 1996 Oct; 182(4):549-59. PubMed ID: 8944899
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
14. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations.
Nowak MA; Sasaki A; Taylor C; Fudenberg D
Nature; 2004 Apr; 428(6983):646-50. PubMed ID: 15071593
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
15. Contingencies of reinforcement in a five-person prisoner's dilemma.
Yi R; Rachlin H
J Exp Anal Behav; 2004 Sep; 82(2):161-76. PubMed ID: 15540503
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
16. Duality between cooperation and defection in the presence of tit-for-tat in replicator dynamics.
Baek SK; Yi SD; Jeong HC
J Theor Biol; 2017 Oct; 430():215-220. PubMed ID: 28755954
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
17. The continuous prisoner's dilemma and the evolution of cooperation through reciprocal altruism with variable investment.
Killingback T; Doebeli M
Am Nat; 2002 Oct; 160(4):421-38. PubMed ID: 18707520
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
18. The dependency game: multiperson reciprocal sharing leads to stable cooperation which can evolve into group formation.
Uitdehaag JC
J Theor Biol; 2009 Sep; 260(2):253-60. PubMed ID: 19527733
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
19. Cumulative benefit games: achieving cooperation when players discount the future.
Stephens DW
J Theor Biol; 2000 Jul; 205(1):1-16. PubMed ID: 10860696
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
20. Invading wave of cooperation in a spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma.
Ferriere R; Michod RE
Proc Biol Sci; 1995 Jan; 259(1354):77-83. PubMed ID: 7700879
[TBL] [Abstract][Full Text] [Related]
[Next] [New Search]
