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Journal Abstract Search
132 related items for PubMed ID: 16806274
1. Involuntary defection and the evolutionary origins of empathy. Fishman MA. J Theor Biol; 2006 Oct 21; 242(4):873-9. PubMed ID: 16806274 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
6. Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in n-person games. Suzuki S, Akiyama E. J Theor Biol; 2008 Jun 21; 252(4):686-93. PubMed ID: 18371983 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
7. Cooperation in defence against a predator. Garay J. J Theor Biol; 2009 Mar 07; 257(1):45-51. PubMed ID: 19070624 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
8. The evolution of n-player cooperation-threshold games and ESS bifurcations. Bach LA, Helvik T, Christiansen FB. J Theor Biol; 2006 Jan 21; 238(2):426-34. PubMed ID: 16045941 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
11. Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity. Suzuki S, Akiyama E. J Theor Biol; 2007 Apr 07; 245(3):539-52. PubMed ID: 17182063 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
14. Neighbor intervention: a game-theoretic model. Mesterton-Gibbons M, Sherratt TN. J Theor Biol; 2009 Jan 21; 256(2):263-75. PubMed ID: 18977365 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
15. How should we define goodness?--reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity. Ohtsuki H, Iwasa Y. J Theor Biol; 2004 Nov 07; 231(1):107-20. PubMed ID: 15363933 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
17. Evolutionary dynamics of the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma. Le S, Boyd R. J Theor Biol; 2007 Mar 21; 245(2):258-67. PubMed ID: 17125798 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
18. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Panchanathan K, Boyd R. Nature; 2004 Nov 25; 432(7016):499-502. PubMed ID: 15565153 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
19. Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation. Ohtsuki H, Iwasa Y. J Theor Biol; 2007 Feb 07; 244(3):518-31. PubMed ID: 17030041 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
20. Finite populations choose an optimal language. Pawlowitsch C. J Theor Biol; 2007 Dec 07; 249(3):606-16. PubMed ID: 17905309 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related] Page: [Next] [New Search]