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Journal Abstract Search

405 related items for PubMed ID: 28431890

  • 1. Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?
    Kurokawa S.
    Math Biosci; 2017 Jul; 289():20-28. PubMed ID: 28431890
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 2. The extended reciprocity: Strong belief outperforms persistence.
    Kurokawa S.
    J Theor Biol; 2017 May 21; 421():16-27. PubMed ID: 28347728
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 3. Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators.
    Kurokawa S.
    Math Biosci; 2016 Dec 21; 282():16-20. PubMed ID: 27693301
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 4. Persistence extends reciprocity.
    Kurokawa S.
    Math Biosci; 2017 Apr 21; 286():94-103. PubMed ID: 28212841
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 5. Duality between cooperation and defection in the presence of tit-for-tat in replicator dynamics.
    Baek SK, Yi SD, Jeong HC.
    J Theor Biol; 2017 Oct 07; 430():215-220. PubMed ID: 28755954
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 6. Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game.
    Mamiya A, Ichinose G.
    J Theor Biol; 2019 Sep 21; 477():63-76. PubMed ID: 31201882
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 7. Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors.
    Kurokawa S, Wakano JY, Ihara Y.
    Theor Popul Biol; 2010 Jun 21; 77(4):257-62. PubMed ID: 20226204
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 8. Green-beard effect predicts the evolution of traitorousness in the two-tag Prisoner's dilemma.
    Laird RA.
    J Theor Biol; 2011 Nov 07; 288():84-91. PubMed ID: 21821051
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 9. Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from Prisoner's Dilemma to Snowdrift.
    Chao L, Elena SF.
    Proc Biol Sci; 2017 May 17; 284(1854):. PubMed ID: 28490625
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 10. Sequential interactions-in which one player plays first and another responds-promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games.
    Laird RA.
    J Theor Biol; 2018 Sep 07; 452():69-80. PubMed ID: 29763610
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 11. The continuous Prisoner's dilemma: II. Linear reactive strategies with noise.
    Wahl LM, Nowak MA.
    J Theor Biol; 1999 Oct 07; 200(3):323-38. PubMed ID: 10527721
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 12. Cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game with probabilistic abstention.
    Cardinot M, Griffith J, O'Riordan C, Perc M.
    Sci Rep; 2018 Sep 28; 8(1):14531. PubMed ID: 30266934
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 13. Collapse of cooperation in evolving games.
    Stewart AJ, Plotkin JB.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A; 2014 Dec 09; 111(49):17558-63. PubMed ID: 25422421
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 14. Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games.
    Miyagawa D, Mamiya A, Ichinose G.
    J Theor Biol; 2022 Sep 21; 549():111211. PubMed ID: 35810777
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 15. Evolution of cooperation in a multidimensional phenotype space.
    Kroumi D, Lessard S.
    Theor Popul Biol; 2015 Jun 21; 102():60-75. PubMed ID: 25847145
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 16. Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spaces.
    McAvoy A, Hauert C.
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A; 2016 Mar 29; 113(13):3573-8. PubMed ID: 26976578
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 17. Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat.
    Yi SD, Baek SK, Choi JK.
    J Theor Biol; 2017 Jan 07; 412():1-7. PubMed ID: 27670803
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 18. Invading wave of cooperation in a spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma.
    Ferriere R, Michod RE.
    Proc Biol Sci; 1995 Jan 23; 259(1354):77-83. PubMed ID: 7700879
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 19. A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
    Zheng XD, Li C, Yu JR, Wang SC, Fan SJ, Zhang BY, Tao Y.
    J Theor Biol; 2017 May 07; 420():12-17. PubMed ID: 28259660
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

  • 20. The effect of power asymmetries on cooperation and punishment in a prisoner's dilemma game.
    Bone JE, Wallace B, Bshary R, Raihani NJ.
    PLoS One; 2015 May 07; 10(1):e0117183. PubMed ID: 25629971
    [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]

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