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Journal Abstract Search
160 related items for PubMed ID: 28684866
1. Evolutionary dynamics of N-person Hawk-Dove games. Chen W, Gracia-Lázaro C, Li Z, Wang L, Moreno Y. Sci Rep; 2017 Jul 06; 7(1):4800. PubMed ID: 28684866 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
2. Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games. Křivan V, Galanthay TE, Cressman R. J Theor Biol; 2018 Oct 14; 455():232-248. PubMed ID: 29990466 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
3. Distraction sneakers decrease the expected level of aggression within groups: a game-theoretic model. Dubois F, Giraldeau LA, Hamilton IM, Grant JW, Lefebvre L. Am Nat; 2004 Aug 14; 164(2):E32-45. PubMed ID: 15278850 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
5. The asymmetric Hawk-Dove game with costs measured as time lost. Křivan V, Cressman R. J Theor Biol; 2022 Aug 21; 547():111162. PubMed ID: 35577103 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
7. Fast game theory coupled to slow population dynamics: the case of domestic cat populations. Auger P, Pontier D. Math Biosci; 1998 Feb 21; 148(1):65-82. PubMed ID: 9597825 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
8. Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games. Křivan V, Cressman R. J Theor Biol; 2017 Mar 07; 416():199-207. PubMed ID: 28069448 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
9. [Evolutionary stability analysis of asymmetric hawk-dove game considering the impact of common resource]. Liu QL, He JZ, Yang Y, Wang YQ, Gao L, Li YT, Wang RW. Dongwuxue Yanjiu; 2012 Aug 07; 33(4):373-80. PubMed ID: 22855444 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
11. Stags, Hawks, and Doves: Social Evolution Theory and Individual Variation in Cooperation. Van Cleve J. Integr Comp Biol; 2017 Sep 01; 57(3):566-579. PubMed ID: 28957516 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
12. The hawk-dove game in a sexually reproducing species explains a colourful polymorphism of an endangered bird. Kokko H, Griffith SC, Pryke SR. Proc Biol Sci; 2014 Oct 22; 281(1793):. PubMed ID: 25209943 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
14. If animals know their own fighting ability, the evolutionarily stable level of fighting is reduced. McNamara JM, Houston AI. J Theor Biol; 2005 Jan 07; 232(1):1-6. PubMed ID: 15498587 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]
18. Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game. Tomassini M, Pestelacci E, Luthi L. Biosystems; 2010 Jan 07; 99(1):50-9. PubMed ID: 19733619 [Abstract] [Full Text] [Related]